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RECENT DECISIONS

a remedy which otherwise might have been denied him, for there is
2
a dearth of respectable authority to support the position taken. '
It is submitted that the New York courts will not follow the view
set forth in the principal case. When an intent to engage in an unreasonable and unprivileged physical contact is clearly shown, and the
resulting injury, though not intended, is the natural and probable
consequence of the act, assault and battery is the proper remedy to
be pursued, 22 and, in New York, the two-year assault and battery
statute of limitation, 23 rather than the three-year negligence statute
of limitation, 24 is applicable.
H. I. L.
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GUEST STATUTE.-The defendant had transported plaintiff to a social
gathering. Before beginning the return trip, plaintiff entered defendant's automobile but alighted when defendant couldn't find the car
keys. The defendant inadvertently caused the vehicle to lurch backwards, thus striking the plaintiff. Defendant offers as a bar to this
action to recover for the injuries so sustained, Ohio Gen. Code Ann.
§ 6308-6 which states, in substance, that the owner, responsible for
the operation of a motor vehicle, shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to a guest, while being transported without
payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, resulting from the
operation thereof, unless such injuries are caused by the willful or
wanton misconduct of such operator. Defendant contends that the
phrase, in or upon said notor vehicle, should be construed as to include a mere temporary interruption in the transportation as the
alighting of plaintiff in this case, and, as a matter of law, that plaintiff
was being transported as a guest at the time she was struck. Held,
judgment for the plaintiff. To hold as defendant contends would
require the elimination from the statute of the words, "in or upon
said motor vehicle." Eshelman v. Wilson, - Ohio App. -, 80 N. E.
2d 803 (1948).
The common law of most states has placed the gratuitous automobile guest in much the same position as a mere invitee concerning
defects in the vehicle; the owner is responsible only for injuries
21 Johnston v. Pittard, 62 Ga. App. 550, 8 S. E. 2d 717 (1940); Baltimore
City Pass. Ry. v. Tanner, 90 Md. 315, 45 AtI. 188 (1900); Koons v. Rook,

295 S. W. 592 (Tex. Com. App. 1927), affirming Rook v. Koons, 289 S. W.
107722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
McGovern v. Weis, 265 App. Div. 367, 370, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 115, 118 (4th
Dep't 1943); Gage v. Bewley, 160 N. Y. Supp. 1111 (Co. Ct. 1916), aff'd
mnem., 175 App. Div. 914, 160 N. Y. Supp. 1131 (4th Dep't 1916); Noonan v.
Luther, 206 N. Y. 105, 99 N. E. 178 (1912).
23N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 50.
24 N.

Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § 49.
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caused by defects, known to him." There is a greater variation of
opinion, however, on the question of an owner's liability for injuries
caused by his operation of the vehicle. Massachusetts courts hold
the owner liable only for injuries caused by his gross negligence; 2
whereas, New York makes no distinction as to the degrees of negligence in such cases.3 A few states with a common law doctrine
similar to that of New York have enacted guest statutes to lift from
car owners the burden of liability for ordinary negligence to gratuitous guests. Such attempts have oftimes proved to be ineffective
because of ambiguity in the wording of the Act.
In the principal case defendant's contention as to when the guest
relationship terminates is strongly supported in a Massachusetts
case, Donahue v. Kelley,4 wherein plaintiff and defendant while on
an automobile journey and preparatory to making the return trip,
plaintiff was injured by defendant who was maneuvering his car into
position to enable plaintiff to get in. The court held that the relationship between the parties had not terminated and that the plaintiff
was still a guest, thus absolving defendant from liability in the absence of any gross negligence on his part. In passing upon the same
question a later Massachusetts case, arriving at a similar result, held,
"The stop, which was for a common purpose, was an incidental part
of the transportation and a part of the undertaking would not have
been completed . . . until the common purpose . . . had been

abandoned." 5
These decisions, though sound in reason, are of no avail in
overcoming obstacles created by certain words in a statutory enactment. Words in a statute should be construed as they are generally
understood, and effect must, if possible, be given to each and every
word of an act. 6 Conclusions reached in other jurisdictions involving
guest statutes afford little help because of the dissimilarity in the
wording of each particular act. At best they serve to exemplify the
strict construction which courts give to statutes enacted to change
the common law. 7 In cases where the plaintiff was injured while
cranking defendant's car; 8 or while moving from the rear to the
front seat, the automobile being parked, 9 the courts held that the
TORTS 633 (1941).
2Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168 (1917).
3 Higgins v. Mason, 255 N. Y. 104, 174 N. E. 77 (1930) ; Clark v. Traver,
205 App. Div. 206, 200 N. Y. Supp. 82 (3d Dep't 1923), aff'd, 237 N. Y. 544
(1923); Bolton v. Madsen, 205 App. Div. 180, 181, 199 N. Y. Supp. 353 (3d
Dep't 1923), the court states: "The law seems to be well settled that even
though the plaintiff's intestate was an invited guest, the defendant owed him
the duty of exercising reasonable care."
4 306 Mass. 511, 29 N. E. 2d 10 (1940).
5Ethier v. Audette, 307 Mass. 111, 29 N. E. 2d 707 (1940).
6 Schraeder v. State, 28 Ohio App. 248, 162 N. E. 647 (1928).
7 Smith v. Pope, 53 Cal. App. 2d 95, 127 P. 2d 292, 296 (1942).
8 Moreas v. Ferry, 135 Cal. App. 202, 26 P. 2d 886 (1933).
9 Prager v. Isreal, 15 Cal. 2d 89, 98 P. 2d 729 (1940).
'PRossER,
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guest statute 10 in that state didn't protect the owner from liability
because the statute required that the automobile be moving and the
person be injured while riding, though in each case the common
purpose had not been abandoned.
The present case has been well decided in view of the narrow
wording of the statute. There exists, however, the dilemma of the
legislature endeavoring to protect the car owner from liability for
ordinary negligence to a gratuitous guest, and the judiciary forced
into declaring the injured party not a guest, thus saving for him a
right of action which existed prior to the statutes when he might
well have been deemed a guest. The courts are blameless. It is the
duty of the legislature to choose more accurate language and until
they do so, the courts must interpret the statutes as they are written.
J. I. L.

TORTS-LANDLORD AND TENANT-LIABILITY FOR LATENT DE-

FECTS-IMPLIED WARRANTY.-Plaintiff tenant was injured when a

wall-bed in her furnished apartment became disengaged from the
fastenings on the door as she lowered the bed. For fourteen months
the bed had been used by plaintiff and was apparently in good condition. Held, judgment for defendant. Even if there is an implied
warranty that a completely furnished apartment is suitable for occupancy, the liability of a landlord for injuries to tenant due to a
defective condition or faulty construction of demised premises is confined to the condition of the premises at the beginning of the term.
With respect to conditions arising subsequently there is no liability
in the absence of proof that landlord had knowledge of the defect.
Forrester v. Hoover Hotel & Investment Co., - Cal. App. 2d -,
196 P. 2d 825 (1948).
The theory of warranty of habitability of premises leased furnished emanated from England ' and was met with disfavor in all
jurisdictions in the United States with the exception of Massachusetts. 2 New York repudiated the doctrine in an early case.3 The
holding has never been overruled and is the settled law of the state.
In the Pennington decision 4 California conformed with the precedent
established in England and Massachusetts. The ruling was based on
a California statute providing that a depositor must indemnify the
10 CALIFORNIA VEHICLE ACT ST. 1929 as phrased in Smith v. Pope, spra
note 7. Any person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle, moving
upon any of the public highways . . . and while so riding receives . . . an
injury shall have no right of recovery against the owner.
1
Smith v. Marrable, 11 M. & W. 5.
2
WALSH, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 287 (2d ed. 1937).
3 Franklin v. Brown, 118 N. Y. 110, 23 N. E. 126 (1889).
4 Fisher v. Pennington, 116 Cal. App. 248, 2 P. 2d 518 (1931).

